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 Increased cockpit automation on modern jet aircraft aim to reduce the risk of Undesired 
Aircraft State (UAS) instances such as Loss of Control in Flight (LOC-I). Although LOC-
I globally accounts for only 9% of all analysed accidents IATA has reported that it was 
responsible for 58% of all accident fatalities in 2017. The focus of this paper is to answer 
whether Threat and Error Management and Crew Resources Management (CRM) 
techniques are an efficient risk management tool when facing a LOC-I threat. Three LOC-
I final aircraft accident reports were analysed to understand the structure of Human 
Factors (HF) during these flights. Methods from the HF field such as the Generic Error 
Modelling System (GEMS) and Skill-, Rule- and Knowledge-based (SRK) error approach 
provided invaluable insights to identify potential findings. A holistic investigation of 
cognitive structures in flight path management helped to visualise latent conditions and 
cognitively demanding tasks during LOC-I in routine operations. Bearing in mind the 
limited number of cases considered in this paper it should be considered as an overview 
in LOC-I accident analysis. It shows that leadership and teamwork, as essential aspects of 
CRM training, can serve as key strategies to mitigate HF problems and LOC-I risks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to answer the research question of this paper 
whether TEM and CRM techniques on flight deck are an 
efficient risk management tool on the flight deck when facing 
a LOC-I threat, we sought for potential human factors findings 
in three LOC-I final aircraft accident reports [1-3]. These 
reports were chosen based on discussions amongst the three 
authors under the lead of Dr Ivan Sikora. Mr Moritz Hanusch 
and Mr Benjamin Hari are both active airline pilots for a major 
European Airline, additionally acting as CRM instructor and 
Human Factors Specialist, respectively. 
Following intensive brainstorming in our team and 
discussions with subject matter experts from aviation industry, 
we have chosen the Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) 
and its extension of the Skill-, Rule- and Knowledge-based 
(SRK) error approach as defined by Rasmussen [4]. As they 
appeared to be most in line with the findings obtained in the 
mentioned LOC-I accident reports, these approaches seemed 
suitable to form a baseline in our analysis. 
In the three analysed LOC-I accidents, the aircraft was 
certified according to EASA Certification Specification for 
Large Aeroplanes (CS-25) specifications and met the required 
aerodynamic stability requirements [5]. However, in two 
occasions, improper inputs into the flight controls by the flight 
crew following an uncommanded autopilot disconnection led 
to a complex aeroplane upset (UAS), LOC-I and a fatal hull 
loss [1, 3]. On the other hand, through CRM and TEM 
techniques displayed by the flight deck team during an 
uncontained engine failure on Qantas Flight 32, the crew 
performed an emergency landing, and all occupants survived 
without injuries [2]. 
We aim to analyse the structure of human factors during 
these flights and whether CRM techniques are an effective risk 
mitigation tool to manage such complex situations. 
The main challenge was to narrow down a large amount of 
information obtained from the aforementioned accident 
reports, official publications and from human factor researches. 
Therefore, this paper should be considered as an overview in 
LOC-I accident analysis other than an in-depth human factor 
study of each LOC-I accident. While the recent Boeing 
737Max accidents represented LOC-I cases as well, we 
considered them to be beyond the scope of this paper, mainly 
due to the ongoing investigations as well as the distinct 
complexity of these cases. However, with the final accident 
investigation report on the Lion Air case [6] as well as the 
preliminary accident investigation report on the Ethiopian 
Airlines case [7] available, an analysis of these cases along 
CRM, TEM and Safety Management aspects would represent 
a preferable area of further research. 
Following this introduction in the rest of Section 1, the 
paper introduces the term of Loss of Control – Inflight (1.1), 
presenting the magnitude of the challenge in recent years and 
highlighting the industry (1.2) and academic research 
initiatives (1.3). Next two sections (Section 2 and Section 3) 
focus on CRM techniques and current human factor researches 
to analyse how these risk management tools can support the 
flight crew in maintaining situational awareness on a highly 
automated flight deck. Section 4 extends CRM application to 
LOC-I situations management while Section 5 offers a further 
explanation on the task demand on flight crew during them. 
Penultimate Section 6 discusses ongoing challenges regarding 
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 the LOC-I, flight crew and their skills. Conclusions are 
addressed in the final section (7.0). 
 
1.1 LOC-I accident analysis 
 
In its dedicated “Loss of Control In-Flight Accident 
Analysis Report 2010-2014” [8], the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) has defined LOC-I as follows: 
“LOC-I refers to accidents in which the flight crew was unable 
to maintain control of the aircraft in flight, resulting in an 
unrecoverable deviation from the intended flight path.” LOC-
I situations often lead to aerodynamic stalls; they represent 
“[…] one of the most complex accident categories, involving 
numerous contributing factors that act individually or, more 
often, in combination” [8]. Unexpected degradations in 
automation often leave flight crews overwhelmed by the 
situation as they are struggling with system failure diagnosis 
while being forced to manually control the aircraft. According 
to research performed by Wilborn & Foster [9], most LOC-I 
situations develop within under 10 seconds. In line with these 
observations, a 2016 accident involving a Swedish Canadair 
Regional Jet [3] can be considered as exemplarily: only five 
seconds after first system anomalies were recorded, erroneous 
pilot inputs had led to negative g-loads. In turn, the resulting 
upset condition massively obstructed subsequent recovery 
attempts by the pilots. 
 
1.2 Aviation industry initiatives 
 
Following above mentioned high-profile LOC-I accidents 
(i.e. [1]), a considerable number of safety-driven efforts to 
manage the LOC-I risk by improving flight crew’s 
competencies in manual flight path control have been 
performed by the Aviation Industry in the past ten years since 
2018. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
has identified LOC-I as one of three high-risk accident 
categories in its Safety Reports during the last years [10]. In 
its Safety Report 2017, IATA has pointed out that while LOC-
I accidents accounted for only 9% of all analysed accidents, 
they were responsible for 58% of all accident fatalities in 2017 
[11]. Moreover, taking into account a timeframe of ten years, 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has identified 
“aircraft upset or loss of control” as the “[…] most common 
accident outcome for fatal accidents in CAT aeroplanes 
operations, accounting for 75% of them” [12]. A risk 
assessment performed by Hari in 2015 indicates that the 
probability of a fatal LOC-I accident is as low as 1×10-5 %, or 
one fatal accident out of five million flights. This confirms its 
risk nature: very remote but with high severity. Nevertheless, 
the very low probability does not justify the acceptance of the 
LOC-I risk [13]. In its latest Safety Report, IATA [11] 
confirmed that the entire industry has to continuously strive 
for a mitigation of the LOC-I risk as it is on the top end of both 
accident frequency and mortality risk statistics (cf. Figure 1). 
In its recent Safety Reports, IATA detailed top contributing 
factors leading to LOC-I aircraft accidents (cf. [11]). Flight 
crew errors relating to manual handling and flight controls 
were a significant contributing factor in 35% of all LOC-I 
accidents in 2017, while other top contributing factors were 
SOP adherence and cross-verification, and pilot-to-pilot 
communication. In its extensive report on flight path 
management issues, the Flight Deck Automation Working 
Group [14] has identified several vulnerabilities in pilot skills 
for manual flight operations. IATA [8] added more specific 
insights regarding LOC-I accidents: “Human performance 
deficiencies, including improper, inadequate or absent training, 
automation and flight mode confusion, distraction the ‘startle’ 
factor and loss of situational awareness frequently 
compounded the initial upset and precluded an effective 
recovery until it was too late.“ [11] identified flight crew errors 
relating to manual handling and flight controls as a primary 
contributing factor in more than 60% of all accidents in 2017 
(cf. Figure 2). 
Analysing the rationale, in its Safety Report 2015, IATA 
states that “the generally high reliability and usefulness of 
automated systems pose the question of whether the high 
amount of flight hours spent in fully automated flight is 
responsible for pilots being increasingly reluctant to revert to 
manual flying skills when needed”. Furthermore, IATA 
concludes that “While aircraft are highly automated, the 
automation is not designed to recover an aircraft from all 
unusual attitudes. Therefore, flight crews must still be capable 
of manually operating the aircraft, especially in edge-of-the-
envelope situations.” [15]. As a mitigation strategy for the near 
term, Jacobsen [16] has urged the industry to perform LOC 
training and to adopt better Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP). IATA [17] added: “For the moment it seems that a 
well-trained pilot is still the best gadget on board an aircraft, 
to cope with the full range of possible situations whether 
foreseen or not. So, the question that needs to be asked is, 
regardless of the technology on your aircraft, what do you do 
to make your pilots more competent in upset prevention and 
recovery?” Since Upset Prevention and Recovery Training 
(UPRT) [18] has become an industry-standard, including 
mandatory simulator and CRM training elements for flight 
crews. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Accident category frequency and fatality risk (2013-2017) [11] 
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Figure 2. Accident primary contributing factors distribution – flight crew errors [11] 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between TEM, the core competencies and UPRT [17] 
 
1.3 Academic researches 
 
Following initiatives by the aviation industry to address the 
risk of LOC-I, the Netherland Aerospace Center (NLR) 
published their report about manual flight path management of 
modern jet transport aircraft in January 2015 as part of the EU 
funded Man4Gen project. The contributors agreed that 
because of increased safety requirements and efficiency of 
commercial air transport operation, pilots’ flight path 
management tasks have transitioned from manually flying the 
aircraft by means of manual flight control inputs to 
programming a complex automation system and monitoring 
cockpit parameters during most phases of the flight [15, 19].  
The results and conclusions obtained in the Man4Gen 
research project were implemented in the Safety 
Recommendation NETH-2014-005 (DSB), which was 
included in the Annual Safety Recommendations Review 
2014 issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency. It is 
recommended to “review the applicable regulations on initial 
and recurrent flight crew training to assess whether they 
adequately address the potential degradation of situational 
awareness (basic pilot skills) and flight path management due 
to increased reliance on aircraft automation by flight crews.” 
[20]. 
EASA acknowledged the recommendation in their 
aforementioned Safety Review 2014:  
“[…] the trend towards increased automation in aircraft 
design calls for a review of the rules to consider training on 
the potential degradation of situational awareness and flight 
path management due to increased reliance on automation by 
flight crews.” [20]. 
The next chapters will focus on CRM techniques and 
current human factor researches to analyse how these risk 
management tools can support the flight crew in maintaining 
situational awareness on a highly automated flight deck. 
 
 
2. CRM TECHNIQUES TO MANAGE THE LOC-I RISK 
 
2.1 Threat and Error Management (TEM) 
 
Despite the good safety statistics in recent years, efforts to 
maintain this relatively low accident rate must continue. Based 
on the information given in Figure 3, correctly applied TEM 
techniques are the last line of defence when correcting an 
Undesired Aircraft State (UAS) following an uncommanded 
degradation of the automated flight control system. Those 
competencies are provided during simulator sessions and 
CRM courses, enabling the flight crews to build competences 
and skills to be effective risk managers on the flight deck and 
thus a reliable line of defence in the LOC-I threats cascade. 
The Guidance Material provided by IATA states that TEM 
is the best countermeasure to manage a UAS. Because the 
number and conditions of possible causes of an aircraft upset 
are infinite, TEM gives the pilot the right set of competencies 
to manage an unforeseen event [18]. 
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 2.2 TEM and Evidence-Based Training (EBT) 
 
It is of paramount importance to continuously implement 
results gained from the latest human factors research into 
Evidence-Based Training (EBT) for airline pilots, providing 
flight crews with a TEM tool to manage the complexity of 
LOC-I situations. They are the last line of defence when 
challenging or unexpected failures occur in the flight deck. 
During all phases of flight, such failures can degrade an 
aircraft’s automation and require the flight crew to take over 
manual aircraft control to prevent a UAS. Occurrences 
containing this level of complexity are extremely rare but may 
have fatal outcomes if the crew fails to correct the UAS [18, 
21]. 
 
2.3 The limits of expertise in TEM 
 
The deep and complex structure in task management on the 
flight deck can cause new threats [21]. As a result, highly 
skilled professionals can find themselves at the limit of their 
expertise, especially as interactions between cockpit 
automation and pilots’ behaviour are dynamic during 
situations of startle and surprise. 
In the next chapter, a comprehensive human factors study 
describing the influencing factors on pilots’ situational 
awareness during the aforementioned situations aims to 
provide the reader with a more profound overview to 
understand the complexity of LOC-I. 
 
 
3. HUMAN FACTORS APPROACHES AND MODELS 
 
3.1 Flight path management in routine flight operation 
 
The flight deck environment of a modern jet transport 
aircraft features a fly-by-wire flight control system and a fully 
automated flight envelope protection to keep the aircraft 
within safe aerodynamic limits during all flight phases. 
Notable modern jet aircraft currently in service are, i.e. Airbus 
A350, Boeing 777 and 787. 
The human-machine system consists of two main elements 
which interact with each other throughout all phases of flight 
[22]: 
Human 
• A team composed of qualified and licensed flight 
crew members. 
• Members are performing complex decision making 
and problem-solving. 
• Flight risk assessment and management is performed 
by applying TEM. 
Machine 
• Combination of an automated system consisting of 
autopilot and autothrottle, which controls the flight 
path. 
• Automation processes flight information from 
various sources. 
• Inputs are processed and translated into physical 
manipulation of the aircraft flight path around its 
three axes. 
With a higher surplus of cognitive resources available, the 
flight crew can increase the level of automation from manual 
flight to fully automated flight path management around the 
three axes. Modern flight deck automation is so reliable that 
the routine work of airline pilots is shifted towards higher 
order cognition like complex decision making, problem-
solving or managing threats and errors. The automated system, 
which mainly consists of the autopilot and autothrottle, 
controls the flight path to relieve cognitive resources of its 
human operator, the flight crew. It is responsible for 
progressing flight information like vertical or lateral changes 
in the flight trajectory and the physical manipulation of the 
aircraft around its three axes with the aid of ailerons, elevator 
and rudder. The pilots are manipulating the flight path by 
selecting, i.e. a vertical speed and heading on the flight 
guidance panel or a new waypoint on the Multifunction 
Control Display Unit (MCDU). A manual input with the 
control yoke to direct the aircraft to the desired flight path is 
not required in the automated mode. Only its correct execution 
by the automation system must be monitored and 
acknowledged by the flight crew [15, 22]. 
 
3.2 Manual flight path management following 
uncommanded automation disconnection 
 
In case of an uncommanded disconnection of automation, 
as happened in the three LOC-I accidents, the automation level 
reverts to manual, and the cognitive work distribution between 
pilots and the machine (automation) differs from the routine 
flight operation model: 
Human 
• Physical motor skills control primary flight controls 
(aileron, elevator and rudder) using control yoke and 
rudder pedals. 
• Cognitive skills assess current aircraft condition, 
predict its future state and manage the flight path to 
satisfy navigational requirements. 
Machine 
• Translates pilot’s manual flight path management 
inputs with the aid of control yoke and rudder pedals 
into physical manipulation of the aircraft around its 
three axes. 
At all times, flight crews have the responsibility for 
progressing flight information and flight path management. 
Their physical motor skills for manual flight must be able to 
control aircraft’s flight path within safe aircraft and terrain 
limits. Also, cognitive skills, for instance, assessing current 
aircraft condition, predicting its future state, and manage the 
flight path to satisfy navigational and terrain clearance 
requirements have to be employed to assure the safety of the 
aircraft and its occupants [22]. 
 
 
4. CRM TECHNIQUES AS A TOOL TO MANAGE 
LOC-I 
 
4.1 Cognitive demand of flight crews in transient flight 
phases 
 
The cognitive demand described in the previous chapter is 
not uniform across the flight profile but depends significantly 
on the current flight phase, the transient nature of the aircraft 
and environmental weather conditions. During straight and 
level flight, little cognitive effort in flight path monitoring is 
required when the aircraft is appropriately trimmed around its 
three axes. During departure, climb, approach and landing, 
however, much more vertical and lateral transitions in manual 
flight path management are needed to comply with terrain, and 
navigational requirements for Standard Instrument Departures 
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 (SID), Standard Arrival Routes (STAR) and Instrument 
Landing System (ILS) approaches. The higher cognitive 
involvement to monitor and predict the flight path and energy 
of the aircraft during those phases demands far more cognitive 
resources from the flight crew team [22]. Flying under 
degraded flight control protections after experiencing an 
autoflight system failure may place further demands on flight 
crews. Therefore, IATA recommends focussing on training 
scenarios with degraded modes during simulator sessions [15]. 
Airbus’ Statistical Analysis of Commercial Aviation 
Accidents [23] confirms Ebbatson’s argument: it indicates that 
a majority of all aircraft accidents occurred during the 
approach and landing phases (cf. Figure 4). Therefore, we 
conclude that errors are more likely during those phases of 
flight due to the increased workload, possible shortcomings in 
manual flying skill retention and the inherent complexity of 
managing the aircraft’s flight path around its three axes. 
During an error analysis following an automation degradation, 
the flight path monitoring tasks allocated to the flight crews 
may fall beyond their cognitive capabilities, individually and 
as a team [4, 24-26]. Dekker [27] described that issue as 
follows: “In real conditions under which people perform work, 
cognitive and resource limitations, as well as uncertainty and 
the sheer dynamics of unfolding situations all severely 
constrain the choices open to them.” 
The unexpected requirement to manually control the aircraft 
in case of an uncommanded disconnection of the autopilot can 
thus exceed pilots’ capabilities to safely manage their 
aircraft’s flight path. In the 2009 accident of a Colgan Air 
aircraft in Buffalo, the sudden stick shaker activation and 
autopilot disconnection contributed to a surprise & startle 
effect that adversely affected the pilot flying’s response [28]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Accident by flight phase as a percentage of all Accidents 1998-2017 [23] 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The relationship between conscious and automatic behaviour [29], adapted from [4] and [26] 
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5. GEMS MODELLING OF MANUAL FLIGHT PATH 
MANAGEMENT 
 
5.1 Skill, rule and knowledge task management 
classification 
 
The Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) is used to 
describe the deep structure of the limits in task management 
when the dynamic of a LOC-I demands exceptional cognitive 
resources from a team of highly skilled flight crew members. 
Various models are provided in science to analyse human 
errors on this level, but GEMS offers the most holistic 
approach to facilitate the understanding of flight path 
management challenges on modern jet aircraft. To facilitate 
understanding the task demand on flight crews during a LOC-
I, we will use the SRK approach defined by Rasmussen [4] and 
Reason [26]. The degree of conscious control exercised by the 
flight crew over their activities is described by the SRK 
information processing model in Figure 5 above. 
 
5.2 Multi pilot operation in knowledge-based behavior 
 
During multi pilot operation in commercial air transport, the 
designated Pilot Flying (PF) is responsible for controlling the 
aircraft’s flight path (utilising manual aircraft control or using 
the autoflight system). The primary role of the Pilot 
Monitoring (PM) is to monitor PF’s activities and to 
communicate with Air Traffic Control (ATC). All pilots on the 
flight deck are expected to demonstrate a high level of 
monitoring- and cross-checking skills to obtain and maintain 
an accurate mutual mental of their present situation, especially 
concerning the aircraft’s flight path and energy state. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The dynamic model of GEMS (Adapted from [26], 
Highlights added by the Authors) 
 
Based on the Dynamic Model of GEMS, depicted in Figure 
6 above, it can be seen that TEM on the Knowledge-Based 
level requires a reversion to new mental models created in 
dynamic situations like a UAS. Although LOC-I situations are 
infrequent, the flight crew is faced with a highly complex 
scenario where no stored mental models are available anymore. 
Manual flying tasks have to be improvised because previously 
learned routine rules cannot be retrieved on the Knowledge-
Based level. Additionally, sensory channels of humans are 
stimulated unilaterally on a modern flight deck. While the eyes 
and ears form the primary reception channel for the detection 
of the flight attitude, a stressful and emotional situation on a 
flight deck may result in the hearing sensory channel first to 
reach its limitation in perception. Therefore, it can easily 
become unreliable. The human perception system has a natural 
tendency to favour visual to auditory perception when the 
information presented is contradictory and conflicting. 
Therefore, e.g. an aural stall warning during the dynamic 
LOC-I may not be consciously perceived by the pilots [1, 30]. 
 
5.3 Leadership and teamwork 
 
In those rare situations – at the limit of expertise of skilled 
professionals – exceptional leadership abilities and good 
teamwork are paramount to analyse the complexity of the 
developing UAS and to apply robust manual flying skills to 
manage the LOC-I risk. A notable example of a successfully 
managed situation that could otherwise have developed into a 
LOC-I scenario was Qantas flight 32 in 2010. Following an 
uncontained engine failure and a subsequent flight deck 
automation degradation after takeoff, the flight crew was faced 
with an extremely dynamic and rare cascade of failure 
messages but managed the LOC-I threats with an exceptional 
TEM on Knowledge-Based error management (more details 
are provided by Australian Transport Safety Bureau [2]). In a 
2014 incident involving a Lufthansa Airbus A321 [31], the 
flight crew was faced with an uncommanded descent due to 
system malfunctions in two out of three redundant systems. 
Although no procedure was provided in the Quick Reference 
Handbook (QRH) for this kind of failure, the flight crew 
successfully regained control of their aircraft. 
Monitoring is being triggered by the need to satisfy a 
decision requirement, in the context of this paper defined as 
monitoring the flight path and thus preventing a LOC-I 
accident. The execution of this task belongs to the group of 
monitoring goals and includes cross monitoring the other 
pilot’s actions, an accurate assessment of the present situation, 
and monitoring the energy state of the aircraft. However, with 
the words of Warm et al. [32], such “[…] vigilance tasks are 
exacting, capacity-draining assignments that are associated 
with considerable levels of stress in which the quality of 
performance efficiency wanes over time.” 
To achieve the monitoring goal, the pilot has to activate the 
relevant monitoring tasks. They are residing within the brain’s 
long-term memory. The responses are carried out 
subconsciously on the Skill-Based level when these tasks are 
well-rehearsed and familiar to the pilot [33]. 
 
5.4 Situational awareness 
 
The attitude indicator on the flight deck is in the focus of 
selective attention and stimulates the respective senses (visual 
and hearing) via the sensory stores. With the knowledge stored 
in the long-term memory (i.e. basic instrument scanning), the 
brain perceives the sensory responses within the short-term 
memory and interprets the context of the input. In the next step, 
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 the mental model associated with the system knowledge of the 
aircraft is compared against the expected outcomes stored 
within the working memory. By comparing the mental model 
with the actual mental picture, the situation awareness on the 
flight deck is updated, which in turn is the foundation for 
decisions [13, 33]. In a fully developed LOC-I or UAS 
however, the pilot has no reference available in long-term 
memory. A sudden reversion to Knowledge-based responses 
is required, when a skill-based reaction is called for [29]. 
 
5.5 Decision-making models 
 
Even the most skilled and experienced flight crew may be 
prone to ignore feedback information that does not support 
their expectation during a complex automation degradation 
and hence opens opportunities for a further escalation during 
an UAS [26, 29], as demonstrated in the sequence of events 
that led to the Canadair accident in Northern Sweden [3]. 
Experiencing complex failures in the automation system 
during phases of flight with high cognitive involvement 
required by the flight crew, the task management during TEM 
reverts to the Knowledge-Based level if no learned rules to 
manage the LOC-I threat can be found. On this level of 
cognitive information processing, the pilots may be required 
to utilise their technical and operational knowledge. To assist 
pilots in deciding correctly in such a rare anomaly, airlines 
train their crews in decision making which represents a core 
element of Crew Resource Management (CRM) training [34]. 
Apart from other decision-making models (such as FORDEC, 
DODAR, DECIDE, or CLEAR), SPORDEC is a tool several 
airline operators use to enable their pilots to respond to any 
abnormal situation in a structured way [13, 35], see also Table 
1. 
The first priority before commencing any failure 
management is aircraft control. Accordingly, EASA [36] 
clearly stated that “[…] a core philosophy of ‘fly the aeroplane’ 
should permeate the automation policy prepared by air 
operators.” Based on the flight phase, the cognitive 
involvement of the PF may differ and depends on numerous 
external and internal factors. As mentioned earlier, LOC-I is a 
highly complex scenario that places high cognitive demands 
on a flight crew due to its rare nature. Therefore, it is vital to 
store a simple rule where pilots are only required to remember 
the first letters, thus helping them to manage an unforeseen 
anomaly in the cockpit in stressful situations. Preliminary 
actions (i.e. memory items) shall be executed to maintain 
essential control of the aircraft. This also includes collecting 
all data and facts by acknowledging and reading the messages 
displayed on the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor 
(ECAM) or Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System 
(EICAS). A Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) has to be used 
if failures are not displayed or if the aircraft type does not offer 
electronic checklists. 
 
Table 1. SPORDEC decision-model [35] 
 
S Situation Catch 
P Preliminary Actions 
O Options 
R Rating 
D Decision 
E Execution 
C Control 
 
After all, options are discussed and assessed with their 
advantages and disadvantages by the flight crew, a decision 
will be made, resulting in the execution of this decision and 
finally the on-going quality control of this decision. The flight 
crew continuously reassesses the situation; if the decision has 
to be questioned due to new facts or an unforeseen 
development of the situation, the SPORDEC-process has to be 
initiated from the start [37]. 
 
 
6. ONGOING CHALLENGES REGARDING THE LOC-
I RISK 
 
6.1 Limits of expertise in monitoring a reliable cockpit 
automation system 
 
Complex LOC-I situations which require flight crews to 
perform error management on the Knowledge-Based level are 
rare nowadays, mainly due to the high reliability of cockpit 
automation and the strict application of CRM and TEM within 
flight deck work routines. To understand how the cognitive 
information processing of pilots is altered when monitoring a 
reliable automation system, Steven Casner, a research 
psychologist from NASA’s Ames Research Center in Moffett 
Field, California, performed a study with 16 airline pilots on a 
full flight simulator. During the experiment, the cognitive 
information processing in manual flying skill retention 
following unexpected automation failures was examined. 
Casner and his team concluded that basic instrument scanning 
and aircraft control skills are reasonably well retained when 
the cockpit automation is used. However, in line with 
Ebbatson et al. [38] observed that these skills could be subject 
to a certain degree of “rustiness” if not well maintained. They 
concluded that that the quality and accuracy in the retention of 
cognitive resources for manual flight path control depends on 
the degree to which flight crews remain actively engaged in 
the human-machine loop of supervising the cockpit 
automation. Following prolonged monitoring of a highly 
reliable automation system, ‘mind-wandering’ was observed. 
Additional practice during simulator sessions or actual flights 
may help to overcome the erosion of those vital cognitive 
skills. Also, further studies to analyse the effect of active 
monitoring on procedural manual flying skill retention are 
recommended [21, 25]. 
 
6.2 The impact of deficient manual flying skills 
 
In their 2016 study “Flying the Needles: Flight Deck 
Automation Erodes Fine-Motor Flying Skills Among Airline 
Pilots”, Haslbeck and Hoermann stated that “hard and 
continuous drill is indispensable for pilots to acquire and 
maintain the adequate touch and feel essential to manually 
control the aircraft in any conceivable manoeuvre” [39]. 
However, in times of sophisticated automation, pilots’ 
opportunities to maintain their manual flying proficiency can 
be considerably limited. Many airlines even prohibit to 
disengage the Flight Director crossbars during manual flight, 
thus depriving flight crews of so-called “raw data” flying 
opportunities which allow to train “[…] all the complex mental 
calculations of pitch, power, and airspeed control required for 
flight path management of both vertical and lateral navigation” 
[25, 40]. 
The previously mentioned study performed by Ebbatson 
[22] revealed that the individual manual flying ability of pilots 
307
 varied considerably. An explanation could be that “the level of 
recent exposure to manual flight may be dependent upon the 
pilot’s attitude to risk, how they perceive the benefits of 
manual flight and whether they take or seek opportunities to 
disengage the automatics” [22]. Ebbatson et al. [38] were able 
to determine several correlations between the recency of flying 
experience and pilots’ manual flying accuracy. Both studies 
mitigated factors that might falsify a coherent analysis of pilot 
control (such as transport delays, inertia, or the aerodynamic 
stability of aircraft) by measuring “inner-loop” (the pilot’s 
control intention) as well as “outer-loop” (the aircraft’s 
trajectory) parameters. According to Ebbatson [22], “pilots 
with more manual handling experience generally use less 
control input power to achieve equal levels of tracking 
performance.” This clearly supports the regular manual flying 
practice, as “proficient pilots need less effort to control their 
aircraft and to keep it within prescribed parameters” [41]. 
In the study performed by Haslbeck and Hoermann [39], 
126 Airbus A320 and A340 pilots took part in a “raw data” 
simulator assessment that intended to reveal differences in 
regard to the time elapsed since initial flight training (using a 
comparison between captains and first officers) and 
differences in relation to flight practice (using a comparison 
between long-haul and short-haul pilots). The authors 
concluded that a lack of practice (that is clearly correlated with 
long-haul flying) expedites an erosion of manual flying skills. 
This effect was confirmed by a study performed by Hanusch 
[41] in which around 1,500 pilots had taken part in a 
comprehensive survey on their actual manual flying in line 
operations as well as the respective rationale behind. Long-
haul pilots and pilots working for operators obliging rather 
restrictive procedural frameworks or imposing rigid company 
cultures were among those who most criticised to have 
insufficient opportunities to train their manual flying skills 
during line operations. In its extensive report “Operational Use 
of Flight Path Management Systems”, the Flight Deck 
Automation Working Group [14] warned that “(…) pilots who 
have not yet developed extensive manual flying skills may not 
get opportunities to practice and develop those skills, due to 
an increased emphasis on the use of automated systems.” 
 
6.3 Counteracting measures 
 
Ferris et al. [42] described a possible “deskilling” of pilots 
with the following words:  
“[…] Over time, continued and extensive use of automation 
can lead to overreliance on technological assistance and the 
loss of psychomotor and cognitive skills required for manual 
flight […]. Deskilling can lead to a ‘vicious cycle’ of 
performance degradation when pilots’ realisation of their own 
skill loss leads to an even heavier reliance on automation.” 
To counteract this issue, Transport Canada [43] stated that 
“pilots need to maintain manual flying skills to a high degree 
of proficiency and must develop confidence in their ability to 
do so.” In line with recommendations by Jacobsen [16], the 
Flight Deck Automation Working Group [14] and the 
Department of Transport [44], Haslbeck and Hoermann [39] 
added: “More manual flight practice could also be derived by 
changing companies’ automation policies to encourage pilots 
to fly manually if the situation permits.” 
With the words of Bennett (2012, as cited by International 
Air Transport Association) [17]: “Malfunctions are to be 
expected in aircraft, by virtue of their interactive complexity, 
tight coupling and risk-and-error-prone operating environment. 
In the risk-laden world of aviation, the pilot is the last line of 
defence.” 
Those pilots who have sufficient opportunities during 
training and line operations to build, maintain and improve 
their manual flying skills have a far more robust foundation 
when faced with complex scenarios like an impending LOC-I 
as they can revert to well-developed skills on the Rule-based 
level. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper demonstrated that a higher level of cockpit 
automation reliability influences basic manual flying skills 
due to the rare exposure of pilots. We reviewed recent aviation 
safety statistics and learned that the high complexity of LOC-
I poses considerable demands on the cognitive information 
processing of airline pilots even when applying TEM 
standards and established decision-making models. CRM 
techniques are an efficient tool in managing complex UAS 
situations on the flight deck. Based on the findings obtained, 
the academic literature review revealed that the increasing 
level and amount of automation in modern flight decks have 
simplified flight path monitoring tasks in most situations. 
However, too much reliance on the cockpit automation system 
may have adverse effects on situational awareness when 
executing TEM techniques on flight deck. Leadership and 
teamwork as part of the CRM training for flight crews are 
mitigating the associated LOC-I risk. On the other hand, the 
high level of automation has created new opportunities for 
errors and mistakes to be made if pilots do not understand the 
current state of automation.  
Finally, we agree to Casner et al. [25] that this vital 
relationship between the pilots and the reliable machine 
deserves further studies to maintain and improve the good 
safety statistics of recent years. Future academic studies in this 
field will support the aviation industry to maintain its high 
level of safety to provide passengers a safe and reliable air 
transport system. 
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